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This article argues that networked firms are likely to have an advantage in
securing bank finance in countries with weak legal and judicial institutions
since it helps banks and other financial institutions to minimize the
underlying agency costs of lending. An analysis of recent Business
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) data from
15 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries lends some support to
this hypothesis. Even after controlling for other factors, firms affiliated to
Business Associations (BA) are more likely to secure bank finance.
Further, the importance of business networking is particularly evident
among firms who borrow from private domestic banks, as these new banks
attempt to minimize costs of adverse selection. There is also some
confirmation that the significance of networking disappears with improve-
ment in institutional quality.
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JEL Classification: G21; G30; L14; M20; P31
I. Introduction
Problems of contract enforcement are common in
countries with weak institutions because there is no
guarantee that contractual obligations will be upheld
by the local institutions. Networks and informal
relationships may thus emerge to facilitate function-
ing of many organizations in transition and emerging
economies with weak legal and judicial institutions
(e.g. Kandori, 1992; Boisot and Child, 1996; Guiso
et al., 2004; Grief, 2006; Ayyagari et al., 2010).
In this context, this article examines the role of firms’
affiliation to business networks on access to bank
loans and other external corporate financing
opportunities.
Recent empirical studies in the organizational
behaviour literature (e.g. Boisot and Child, 1996)
suggest that informal networks are often a response
to inadequate institutional support. These networks
usually involve an exchange of favours, making
businesses easier for the members. While exchange
within the networks does not rely on explicit written
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contracts, relationships between the members are
guided by norms/conventions. Norms are nothing but
the desirable behaviour subject to sanctions in a
community (Kandori, 1992). Duvanova (2007) argues
that prevalent corruption and bureaucratic pressure
on businesses in post-communist societies may
encourage collective action to combat corruption,
especially when a single firm is no longer able to carry
the burden of high bureaucratic corruption. By
organizing in associations, firms can better protect
themselves from corrupt officials, as Business
Associations (BAs) become a medium of coordina-
tion, information transfer and representation. We go
beyond this literature to argue that BAs may help
affiliated firms to access external financing, especially
when there is corruption and weak legal and judicial
institutions as well as weak enforcement of laws. This
is because the weak legal/judicial structure that
guarantees written contracts and private property
may render difficult credit enforcement. Accordingly,
our first hypothesis is that a firm’s affiliation to a BA
could enhance its external financing opportunities in
general and bank finance in particular. Possible
causes of this link would include, among others, the
following: first, the adverse selection problems of
screening potential borrowers are alleviated if a firm
belongs to a BA as it may allow a lender to obtain
information regarding a firm’s creditworthiness at
lower costs than otherwise. In other words, network-
ing may lower the information asymmetry between
the lender and borrower. A further possibility would
be that BAs explicitly monitor their members and
ensure better repayment for banks, thus alleviating
the moral hazard problems of contract enforcement.
It, however, seems unlikely that BAs in our sample
countries do explicitly perform this monitoring/
supervisory role (see further discussion in
Section II). It could still be the case that a firm’s
affiliation to a BA could minimize the potential moral
hazard problems of strategic default because of the
reputation factor within a close-knit business net-
work. Clearly, the need for networking is greater in
countries with weak institutions1 and as such, the
quality of institutions plays an important role in the
analysis of business networking in this article.
A second and a related hypothesis is therefore to
examine whether the role of business networks
vanishes when institutional quality improves
over time.
Our analysis focuses on a group of Central and
Eastern European (CEE) countries, which constitute
an important case in this article. Even after a decade of
reform, there is an increasing feeling that the reforms
have failed to spur adequately the development of
banking in the CEE countries. Despite widespread
reforms, the use of external finance remains rather
limited (only 20% of our sample firms had access to
some bank finance), even by the standard of other
developing and emerging economies. Further, among
those firms with outstanding bank loans, many tend to
have very high, potentially excessive, leverage
(Coricelli et al., 2012). This necessitates a further
investigation of firms’ external financing opportunities
in the region. In this respect, this article highlights the
role of firms’ affiliations to business networks.
The analysis is developed in two steps. We
primarily use 2005 European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Business
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
(BEEPS) data to test our central hypotheses, distin-
guishing between internal finance, bank finance,
nonbank finance and equity finance. While a test of
our first hypothesis pertains to the sign and signifi-
cance of firm’s affiliation to a BA, a test of our
second hypothesis requires us to include an interac-
tion term between firm’s BA membership and coun-
try’s institutional quality. Since there is limited time
variation in institutional quality for the 3-year period
2002–2005, we can only exploit cross-country varia-
tion in institutional quality to test the validity of the
second hypothesis in our sample.
Note, however, that a firm’s affiliation to a
business network is unlikely to be exogenous as
networked firms are unlikely to be a random sample
of all sample firms. Hence, one needs to correct for
the underlying estimation bias arising from this
selection issue. We adopt two possible approaches:
first, we obtain the predicted value of BA member-
ship using a first-stage regression (with some exclu-
sion restrictions; see further discussion in the Section
‘Addressing possible endogeneity of firm’s affiliation
to business networks’) and use this as a potentially
exogenous instrument for firm’s access to any exter-
nal financing. Second, BEEPS data have a small
panel element where a small fraction of sample firms
were interviewed in both 2002 and 2005 (see further
discussion in Section III). This allows us to use 2002
and 2005 BEEPS panel data to obtain OLS fixed
1Recent literature highlights the importance of legal and institutional structures to enforcing contracts and safeguarding
shareholders’ and creditors’ rights, thus promoting financial and economic development. In particular, La Porta et al. (1997)
suggest that the legal environment matters for the size and the extent of a country’s capital market. Demirguc-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1998) argued that a developed financial system and a stronger rule of law help relaxing firms’ external financing
constraints, which in turn facilitates their growth. Beck et al. (2002) showed that, firms that operate in countries with
underdeveloped financial and legal systems and higher levels of corruption tend to be more constrained than others.
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effects estimates; we were, however, unable to include
recently released 2008 BEEPS data in the panel
analysis as 2008 round of BEEPS does not provide
information on firm’s affiliation to BAs. Use of the
panel component allows us to exploit variation in
firm’s access to external finance over the period
(2002–2005) to identify a causal effect of networking
on firms’ financing opportunities. We also test the
robustness of our results by examining the role of
business networking (vis-a`-vis the two hypotheses of
interest) on firm’s access to loans from state, private
domestic and foreign banks. The latter also allows us
to explore the evidence of firm–bank ownership
matching, if any. This is an important exercise
because ownership matching between firms and
banks may help reduce costs related to adverse
selection in bank lending (e.g. see Berger et al.,
2006), especially in countries with weak institutions.
There is evidence from our analysis that, ceteris
paribus, business networking plays a significant role
on the probability of securing bank finance, especially
from newly formed private domestic banks. We argue
that the latter can be attributed to these new banks’
attempts to trade cautiously in an uncertain business
environment in countries with weak institutions. The
result holds in both cross-section and panel estimates.
Second, there is some support to our second hypoth-
esis (from panel data analysis only) that the signif-
icance of the BA affiliation vanishes for bank finance,
as institutional quality improves. Further, younger
Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) are less
likely to be networked and are also less likely to have
access to various external finances in our sample. In
other words, the lack of business networking in these
post-communist societies may force SMEs to rely
more on internal finance, thus hindering the process
of corporate growth in the region.
The article contributes to a limited but growing
literature on corporate financing in emerging econo-
mies. There is generally a consensus in the literature
that business networks are a feature of the organiza-
tional landscape of many countries though their
nature and effects may vary across the world. Kali
(1999) argued that these networks absorb honest
individuals and raise the density of dishonest indi-
viduals engaged in anonymous market exchange,
which in turn may harm public interest.
Consequently, the payoff from market exchange
may diminish. Along similar lines, Khawaja and
Mian (2009) found that political firms borrow 45%
more and also have 50% higher default rates in
Pakistan between 1996 and 2002, and this preferential
treatment of political firms largely occur in state
banks in the country. In a slightly different context,
Hung et al. (2012) highlights the importance of
political connections for determining Chinese state-
owned enterprises’ decision to list in Hong Kong. In
contrast, cross-country studies on social capital and
economic growth (e.g. see, Knack and Keefer, 1997;
Whiteley, 2000) have generally highlighted the posi-
tive impact of active membership in social organiza-
tion to economic growth. Contrasting findings from
these two strands of the literature thus motivates our
analysis for the emerging economies of CEE. While
there is a growing literature on corporate financing in
the CEE region (e.g. see, Fries and Taci, 2002;
Klapper et al., 2002; De Haas et al., 2007) and also
some literature highlighting the effect of the lack of
social capital in the transition region (e.g. see, Raiser,
1999; Paldam and Svedsen, 2000, 2001) on economic
development and growth in the region, we are not
aware of any study that analyses the role of business
networks on firm external financing opportunities in
the transition region. We integrate various strands of
the existing literature, one on corporate finance and
the second on social capital and economic develop-
ment, to examine the effect of business networks on
corporate financing opportunities in the CEE region.
It is an important exercise because it allows us to
identify a possible micro-economic mechanism
through which business networking can influence
corporate financial opportunities in the region.
Further results from our analysis highlight the
inefficiency caused by business networking, distin-
guishing it from the advantages of social networking
highlighted in the existing literature on social capital.
Given that these countries are undergoing radical
institutional restructuring, it is important that the
informal institutions (e.g. some business networks)
remain compatible with the formal institutions so as
to minimize the possible costs of corruption and tax
evasion and boost economic growth in the region. We
thus hope that this research will inform policy makers
to take steps to ease SME’s access to external
corporate financing opportunities from newly priva-
tized banks (domestic or foreign). However, BEEPS
data does not have information on earnings before
interest or taxes. It only asks firms whether a profit
was made in the last year and unfortunately the
information was missing for a very large proportion
of our sample firms. Hence, we were unable to
examine the effect of firm’s affiliation to business
networks on profitability. We hope future research
will address this.
This article is organized as follows. Section II
explains the data and hypotheses while Section III
develops the empirical methodology. Section IV
analyses the results and the final section concludes
this article.
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II. Data
Our analysis is primarily based on the 2005 EBRD
BEEPS data. BEEPS is a joint initiative of the EBRD
and the World Bank Group. The survey was admin-
istered to a random sample of 11 814 enterprises in 28
countries of CEE, including Turkey and the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), to
examine the quality of the business environment (as
determined by a wide range of interactions between
firms and the state), to assess the environment for
private enterprise and business development. For
further details of the data, see EBRD (2005). For one
particular section of our analysis, we also make use of
the panel element of 2002 and 2005 BEEPS data
though the size of the sample is relatively smaller in
this case (see Sections ‘Addressing possible endo-
geneity of firm’s affiliation to business networks’ and
‘Fixed effects panel logit estimates of firm financing
choice’).
Sample countries
For the purpose of our study, we create a sub-sample
comprising only of firms in the CEE countries –
Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Albania,
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Poland,
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania,
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. This gave
rise to a sample of 5040 firms, representing about
52% of all firms that participated in the 2005 BEEPS
survey. The country distribution of our sample of
firms suggests that Polish firms represent the largest
group followed by Hungary, Romania and Czech
Republic in that order (Table 1).
Descriptive statistics
BEEPS data provides information on whether a firm
is affiliated to any BA, which plays a significant role
in our analysis. Table 1 summarizes the proportion of
firms affiliated to BA in the sample countries, which
clearly highlights the aspect of pronounced inter-
country variation. While Czech Republic has only
21% affiliated firms in our sample, the proportion
rises to as high as 91% in Slovenia closely followed by
88% in Albania. Note that the nature of most BAs in
the Balkan countries like Slovenia, Albania, Croatia,
Serbia and Montenegro are likely to be different from
those in other countries in the CEE region. The
model of business representation in the Balkan
countries was adapted from the ‘continental’ chamber
Table 1. Distribution of firms across sample countries
Country
Number of
firms
% of firms with
BA membership
EBRD bank
reform indexa
Competition
policy indexa
Institutional
quality indexb
FYR Macedonia 200 41.00 2.7 2.0 ÿ3.3
Serbia and Montenegro 300 58.00 2.7 1.0 0.0
Albania 204 88.00 2.7 2.0 ÿ7.1
Croatia 236 82.00 4.0 2.3 0.3
Bosnia-Herzegovina 200 52.00 2.7 1.0 ÿ9.9
Slovenia 223 91.00 3.3 2.7 8.5
Poland 975 30.00 3.7 3.3 7.0
Hungary 610 54.00 4.0 3.3 8.7
Czech rep 343 21.00 4.0 3.0 6.8
Slovak rep 220 34.00 3.7 3.3 2.8
Romania 600 54.00 3.0 2.3 ÿ0.8
Bulgaria 300 43.00 3.7 2.7 0.1
Latvia 205 26.00 3.7 3.0 2.6
Lithuania 205 32.00 3.7 3.3 2.6
Estonia 219 48.00 4.0 3.3 6.1
Total 5040 n/a – – –
Notes: aThe EBRD bank reform and competition policy indices (Source: EBRD, 2009) range between 0 (minimum) and
4þ (maximum). The reform index captures the level of advancement of banking sector restructuring activities in CEE
countries, while the competition policy index measures how fair the business environment is in CEE countries in promoting
healthy competition between enterprises.
bInstitutional quality index is obtained from Bacchetta and Drabek (2002), which is a composite index capturing the strength
of a country’s government to provide the infrastructure to promote a conducive environment for business growth and
development and comprises five component indicators – Government effectiveness, Regulatory burden, Rule of law, graft and
extent of democracy (voice and accountability). The index ranges from ÿ25 to 25, with higher values depicting countries with
higher institutional quality.
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systems in the sense of being based on compulsory
membership upon the official incorporation of an
enterprise or the licensing of entrepreneurial activity.
Note, however, that BA membership is compulsory
only for certain sectors and these sectors may vary
from one Balkan country to another (Duvanova,
2007); the latter explains why despite compulsory BA
membership in the Balkan countries, our sample does
not show 100% membership of BA in the region.
Nevertheless, compared to other sample countries,
BA membership would, in general, be much higher in
the Balkan region in our sample. In an attempt to
capture this regional variation in the BA membership,
we create a Balkan dummy that takes a value 1 for
the subsample Balkan countries, namely Albania,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and
Montenegro and Slovenia, and is zero otherwise. In
other words, inclusion of the Balkan dummy allows
us to distinguish the effect of compulsory member-
ship from the voluntary membership in our analysis
that follows.
Our data also allow us to identify the ways a
networked firm may benefit from their affiliation to
the BA. The list includes lobbying the government
(82.5% of networked firms in our sample), resolving
disputes (83.5% of networked firms), information on
domestic/international product and input markets
(about 90% firms), accrediting quality standards of
the product (89% of networked firms) and getting
information on government regulation (about 91% of
networked firms). The latter in turn suggests that the
BA membership variable is likely to be endogenous to
firm financing, especially when the particular BAs
provide networking-type services (e.g. ‘information
or contacts on domestic markets’).
Our analysis solely considers firm financing for new
investment, which funds future growth opportunities.
In the BEEPS survey, firm managers were asked to
provide information on sources of finance including
internal funds/retained earnings, equity, private
domestic commercial bank borrowing, foreign bank
borrowing, state-owned bank borrowing (including
state development banks), loans from family/friends,
money lenders or other informal sources, trade credit
from suppliers, trade credit from customers, credit
cards, leasing arrangement, the Government (other
than state-owned banks) and other for new invest-
ments (i.e. new land, buildings, machinery, equip-
ment). We aggregate the available information to
create four categories of financing sources: internal
finance, bank finance (when firm obtains loans from
any bank, private domestic commercial, state or
foreign), equity finance and any nonbank finance;
the latter refers to trade credit from suppliers or
customers, credit cards and leasing arrangement.
Thus, external sources of financing in our sample
refer to bank loans, equity financing or any type of
nonbank financing. Note, however, that some firms
tend to obtain financing from more than one source
(internal, external or both). Accordingly, Table 2
Table 2. Distribution of firms reliance on a single source of finance for new investment
Source of finance (%)
Country Internal Bank Nonbank Equity Other Total
FYR Macedonia 35.00 4.50 0.00 1.00 7.50 200
Serbia and Montenegro 47.33 3.33 1.00 0.67 2.33 300
Albania 52.94 5.39 0.00 0.00 0.49 204
Croatia 28.81 8.47 1.69 1.27 0.85 236
Bosnia and Herzegovina 27.50 7.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 200
Slovenia 28.70 4.48 0.90 0.00 2.24 223
Poland 48.41 2.36 1.23 0.10 2.36 975
Hungary 31.15 6.07 2.79 7.54 0.98 610
Czech rep 32.94 3.21 4.96 3.21 11.08 343
Slovak rep 34.09 3.64 3.64 4.55 2.27 220
Romania 46.00 5.50 1.83 0.17 2.17 600
Bulgaria 40.00 7.33 2.67 0.00 2.00 300
Latvia 22.44 5.37 1.95 8.78 3.41 205
Lithuania 36.59 3.41 11.71 1.95 2.44 205
Estonia 31.05 1.83 1.83 0.91 1.37 219
Notes: The table shows the distribution of firm’s financing across sample countries. In particular, here we consider the firms’
reliance on a single source of financing for new investment. Each cell refers to the proportion of firms financed solely by
internal finance, bank finance, nonbank finance, equity finance and other in respective sample countries. Note that
proportions will not add up to 100% in all countries as not all firms will use 100% of any type of finance in sample countries.
Clearly, a high proportion of sample firms rely solely on internal finance; in comparison, very few firms are financed solely by
bank finance.
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shows the proportion of firms relying solely on any
type of internal or external financing. Clearly, reliance
on external financing is rather limited in our sample as
a significant proportion of firms rely solely on internal
finance. In fact, about 39% sample firms relied only
on internal finance for new investment in 2005 in all
countries taken together. Reliance on equity funding
is rather limited as equity markets continue to be
rather under-developed in these countries. A small
proportion (1%–12%) of firms relied solely on bank
or equity financing or trade credit.
While Bonin and Leven (1996) argued that foreign
banks may choose those domestic firms who have
previously established some international links by
virtue of their import/export activities, others have
focused on banks’ preference to serve large firms with
more transparent accounting standards. In this
respect, a comparison between networked and non-
networked firms is informative. Using firms’ BA
membership, we could classify firms into networked
and other nonnetworked firms. Table 3 compares
selected characteristics of networked and nonnet-
worked firms. In general, older state firms and also
foreign firms are significantly more likely to be
networked, while young SMEs in the private domes-
tic sector are significantly less likely to be networked.
In addition, compared to nonnetworked firms, net-
worked firms are more likely to be involved in the
export sector and 68% of networked firms tend to use
international accounting standards. Thus, networked
firms appear to be in a more advantageous position
than other nonnetworked firms. Accounting for BA
membership thus allows us to identify the mechanism
through which some domestic firms may overcome
the domestic barriers of weak institutions and local
practices. However, we cannot compare profitability
of these two groups of firms as this information is not
contained in the BEEPS data.
Finally, using the identity of the largest owner, we
classify firms by ownership structure: (a) state, when
the largest shareholder is government or government
agency; (b) private domestic, when the largest share-
holder is individual/family, general public and
domestic company; (c) foreign, when the largest
shareholder is a foreign company. In a similar
fashion, we classify the banks lending to the sample
firms as state, private domestic commercial and
foreign. Table 4 cross-tabulates the ownership struc-
ture of firms and banks providing loans to the sample
firms. Of the firms that borrow from banks, borrow-
ing from private domestic commercial banks is most
common, irrespective of the firm ownership type
(state-owned, foreign-owned or private domestically
owned). There also seems to be some firm-bank
ownership matching, as private domestic firms are
more likely to use private domestic commercial
banks. Note that the borrowing from state-banks is
not so common in 2005; but again, relatively higher
proportion of state-owned firms borrows from state
banks. EBRD report (2006) suggests a form of bank-
firm matching between large firms and foreign banks
in a selected number of transition countries. Later we
would explore if firm-bank ownership matching
holds, after controlling for all other factors.
Institutional quality
In CEE as well as the Baltic countries, privatization
and institutional reform in the banking sector have
advanced in step with the state’s withdrawal from the
direct provision of banking services and with progress
in enterprise reform. Shleifer (1997) argues that there
Table 3. Comparison of networked and nonnetworked firms
Firm characteristic Number of firms Networked firms Nonnetworked t-statistics
SME 5040 0.8419 0.9631 ÿ14.569***
Young 5034 0.3428 0.4934 ÿ10.954***
Private 5040 0.7227 0.8291 ÿ9.069***
State 4906 0.1065 0.0666 4.945***
Foreign 5040 0.0864 0.0377 7.129***
Growth of fixed assets 4883 127.53 31.34 4.837***
Research and development spending 3163 46.5764 10.4931 5.664***
Exports 5027 0.4008 0.2167 14.324***
International Accounting Standards (IAS) 5040 0.2752 0.1148 14.577***
Notes: The table summarizes the independent sample means test of selected firm characteristics for networked firms and
nonnetworked firms. t-statistics are computed assuming nonequality of means between networked and nonnetworked firms.
A negative and significant t-statistic indicates that networked firms tend to have a significantly lower average of the particular
firm characteristic compared to nonnetworked firms and the opposite holds for positive t-statistic.
***denotes significance at the 1% level.
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has to be a transition of government for a transition
to a market economy to take place. This was
described as de-politicization of the economy,
whereby control over resource use and ownership is
transferred exclusively to the private sector. The role
of the government will then be to provide the
necessary institutions to support the market econ-
omy. This will necessitate not only the creation of
laws and legal institutions that protect the private
property and enforce contracts between private
parties, but also to limit the ability of officials to
prey on the private property.
Considering the sample countries, there is evidence
of a wide dispersion in the institutional quality, bank
reform and competition policy indices among the
15 countries in our sample (Table 1). The institutional
quality index (Bacchetta and Drabek, 2002) is a
composite index capturing the strength of a country’s
government to provide the infrastructure to promote
a conducive environment for business growth and
development and comprises of five component indi-
cators – government effectiveness, regulatory burden,
rule of law, graft and the extent of democracy (voice
and accountability). The bank reform index con-
structed by EBRD captures the level of advancement
of banking sector restructuring activities in the CEE
countries, while the competition policy index mea-
sures how fair the business environment is in the CEE
countries in promoting healthy competition between
enterprises.
It follows from Table 1 that our sample CEE
countries are at very different levels of reform and
there is a bimodal distribution. Many CEE countries
still have a considerable way to reach the interna-
tional levels. This is particularly true for the Balkan
countries like FYR Macedonia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and Albania,
many of which have a negative institutional
quality index. At the other end of the distribution,
the country with the best institutions was Hungary at
8.7, closely followed by Slovenia, Poland, Czech
Republic and Estonia, respectively. Only one-quarter
of the countries actually attained the highest value of
the EBRD bank reform index, including Croatia,
Hungary, Czech Republic and Estonia. In terms of
the competition policy, only five countries, namely,
Poland, Hungary, Slovak Republic, Lithuania and
Estonia, actually attained the highest level of compe-
tition policy reform. We exploit this cross-country
variation in institutional quality indices to explore the
validity of our second hypothesis.
III. Methodology
This section develops the empirical model to test the
two hypotheses of interest with respect to firms’
financing opportunities, distinguishing between inter-
nal finance, bank finance, nonbank finance and
equity finance. In each of these cases, we test the
validity of the two null hypotheses:
H10: Business association membership has no effect
on firms’ financing mode.
H20: Business association membership has no effect
on firms’ financing mode in countries with stronger
institutions.
The alternative hypothesis in each case would be
that there exists a positive effect of BA membership.
We test the validity of our hypotheses for firm’s
financing choice by controlling for all other factors
that may influence financing choice. We also examine
the robustness of our estimates by comparing pooled
(with and without instrument for BA membership)
and panel estimates. Further, we consider the validity
Table 4. Firms’ choice of banks (by ownership type)
Firm ownershipa
Loans from State-owned Private domesticb Foreign
State bank (1) 12 (23.53%) 133 (15.93%) 7 (9.33%)
Private domestic commercial bank (2) 34 (66.67%) 598 (71.62%) 48 (64.00%)
Foreign bank (3) 5 (9.80%) 104 (12.46%) 20 (26.67%)
Total 51 835 75
Notes: The table shows the sample firms’ access to bank loans classified by bank ownership types: state banks,
private domestic banks and private foreign banks. Figures in parentheses refer to the percentages of firms of a
given ownership obtaining loans from state, private domestic and foreign banks. It is constructed from the
BEEPS 2005 questions 45a17 to 45a19, which asked the respondents what proportion of their firm’s new fixed
investment has been financed by borrowing from private domestic commercial banks, borrowing from foreign
banks and borrowing from state-owned banks (including state development banks).
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of these hypotheses for firms’ choice of state, private
domestic and foreign banks.
An empirical model of firm financing choices
In this subsection, we specify the empirical model to
analyse firm’s financing choices for new investment.
As indicated in Section II, firms may use different
sources of finance including internal finance, bank or
equity finance or nonbank credit. While a significant
proportion of firms rely on internal finance only,
many firms tend to combine internal and various
sources of external financing (bank loans, equity and
other nonbank sources). Accordingly, we first define
a variable IFic, which takes a value 1 if the i-th firm in
country c relies 100% on internal finance and zero
otherwise. Suppose the underlying unobserved vari-
able IFic is given by
IFic ¼ 0 þ BABAic þ IQIQc þ BAIQBAic  IQc
þ xXic þ "i ð1Þ
where " is distributed with mean 0 and variance 1,
i¼ 1, . . . ,N refers to the sample firms, while
c¼ 1, . . . , 12 refers to the sample countries. While
BA refers to i-th firm’s affiliation to a BA in c-th
country, IQ refers to the institutional quality index in
the c-th country. We prefer to use a composite
institutional quality index that would enable us to
solve the problem of multicollinearity that would have
resulted had we used individual country level indices.
We also include an interaction between BA and IQ. X
refers to all firm-specific control variables (please see
below for the exact model specification). What we
observe is IFic, which is related to IF

ic as follows:
IFic ¼ 1 if IF

ic4 0
¼ 0 if IFic  0
We use a binary logit model to determine the
likelihood of 100% internal finance for new invest-
ment in our sample.
It is also important to analyse the factors deter-
mining various sources of external financing, namely,
bank finance, equity finance and nonbank finance,
where networking could play an important role.
Accordingly, we create three more variables, which
take the value of 1 if the i-th firm in country c uses
any of the three sources of external finance, and zero
otherwise, as follows:
BFic ¼ 1 if the i-th firm in country c uses any
bank finance;
EFic ¼ 1 if the i-th firm in country c uses any
equity finance;
NBFic ¼ 1 if the i-th firm in country c uses any
nonbank finance as defined in Section IIð Þ:
For a given choice of external finance (BF, EF or
NBF), generally denoted by XF for any source of
external finance, we estimate a binary logit model for
each of the sources of external finance, namely, BF,
EF and NBF. As before, we assume that the under-
lying unobservable variable XFi for the i-th firm is
determined as follows:
XFic ¼ 0 þ BABAic þ IQIQc þ BAIQBAic  IQc
þ xXic þ ui ð2Þ
The observable variable
XFic ¼ 1 if XF

ic4 0 and XFic ¼ 0 otherwise
As before, we assume that the random error term u is
distributed with mean 0 and variance 1 and accord-
ingly use a logit model to determine XFi for each type
of external financing choice, namely, any bank
finance (BF), equity finance (EF) or nonbank
finance (NBF).
Since the logit coefficient estimates do not reflect
the marginal effects of explanatory variables, we
determine the marginal effect separately as the partial
derivative of the expected value of the dependent
variable with respect to the particular explanatory
variable in the estimation of both Equations 1 and 2.
After controlling for all other factors, an empirical
test of hypothesis H10 pertains to the sign and
significance of the coefficient estimates of BA sepa-
rately for internal finance (IF), bank finance (BF),
equity finance (EF) and nonbank finance (NBF).
While a number of studies on banking relationships
(e.g. Kali, 1999; Ghatak and Kali, 2001) have
recognized the importance of BA membership, we
are not aware of any prior study that highlights the
role of networking for firms’ financing opportunities.
Further, we examine the validity of our second
hypothesis by considering the sign and significance
of the estimated coefficient of the interaction term
between firms’ BA membership and country’s insti-
tutional quality.
We follow the existing literature to choose other
firm-specific control variables, X, in each case for
estimating Equations 1 and 2. The ownership struc-
ture of firms (i.e. domestic, foreign) is likely to play
an important role, especially in the context of
networking in an imperfect world (see, e.g.
Detriagache et al., 2000; Berger et al., 2006). To this
end, we include controls for state-owned firms,
private domestic firms and foreign firms.
Following the introduction of the transition pro-
cess in the early 1990s, there has been a significant
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increase in the share of SMEs in the CEE countries;
the latter could be attributed to the break-up of large
state-owned enterprises during the transition. While
other studies have used the log of sales (see, e.g.
Bevan and Danbolt, 2004) and natural logarithm of
the book value of the total property assets (e.g. Ooi,
2000), we use the firm size defined by the labour force
size information adopted by the BEEPS data at our
disposal. In particular, BEEPS data-set classifies
firms into three categories, namely, ‘small’,
‘medium’ and ‘large’ as follows:
Small-sized firm: Employee size 1–49
Medium-sized firm: Employee size 50–249
Large-sized firm: Employee size 250–9999
We merge small- and medium-sized firms together
and label them as SMEs. About 91% of sample firms
are SMEs. We have chosen to focus on SMEs because
they have been targeted not only by the government
(Smallbone and Welter, 2001) but also by the EBRD,
as they generally struggle to raise external finance in
the region. Incidentally, similar classification is used
by Erbas et al. (2008), Kounouwewa and Chao (2011)
and Zhu (2012) among others.
It is also important to identify the newly estab-
lished firms from the rest. Following Klapper et al.
(2002) and Ayyagari et al. (2011), firms with an age of
10 years or less, i.e. those that came into existence
after the year 1995, were defined as ‘young’. 49% of
small firms in our sample fall into the category of
young firms. Both the firm size and age are observed
to determine a firm’s choice of finance. This is
confirmed by Klapper et al. (2002), Berger et al.
(1995) and Beck et al. (2002).
Other control variables include the growth of fixed
assets, prior year research and development spending.
Note, however, that BEEPS data do not provide
information on earnings before interest and taxes,
which is the basis of calculating profitability; we only
observe whether a firm is making any profit or not (as
a binary variable) and as such we could not control
for firm profitability. However, given that there is a
close correlation between the size and profitability,
we hope that to some extent the firm size would
control for profitability. Further, estimation of the
fixed effects panel data model would control for firm-
specific omitted factors (see discussion in Sections
‘Addressing possible endogeneity of firm’s affiliation
to business networks’ and ‘Fixed effects panel logit
estimates of firm financing choice’).
Finally, given that firm’s membership of a BA is
likely to be significantly higher in most Balkan
countries in our sample, we include a binary variable
Balkan indicating whether the firm is located in
a Balkan country. The variable takes a value
zero otherwise. We also combine firm’s BA member-
ship with the Balkan dummy to explore the differen-
tial effect of BA membership in the Balkan countries
(relative to other sample countries), if any. Since the
Balkan countries on average tend to have weaker
institutional quality, the significance of this interac-
tion term allows us to examine the link between
business networks and institutional quality as well.
Addressing possible endogeneity of firm’s affiliation
to business networks
A potential problem with the estimation of
Equations 1–2 using a BA membership variable,
BA, as one of the explanatory variables is that firms’
affiliation to a business network is likely to be
endogenous. This is because firms may choose to
belong to a network with a view to facilitate its
financing access (see discussion in Section II); thus
networked firms are unlikely to be random among all
sample firms. Accordingly, there remains an impor-
tant selection bias that we need to address here. One
possibility would be to generate an instrument for
firm’s affiliation to a business network. To this end,
we first use a logit model to determine sample firm’s
affiliation to a business network. In this respect, our
choice of explanatory variables has largely been
guided by the results from Table 3; in particular, we
include if the firm is an SME, young, state, private or
foreign-owned and also if the firm is located in one of
the Balkan countries. However, it is important to
ensure some exclusion restriction for the estimation
of the selection equation (pertaining to BA member-
ship) with a view to minimize any bias while
estimating firm financing equations (1) and (2) at
the second stage. In particular, we argue that unlike
firms’ financing opportunities, growth of fixed assets
and research and development spending are not
pertinent in the determination of first-stage BA
membership equation so that they are excluded
from the first-stage regression. Further we include a
sector control, namely, if a firm is involved in export
sector in determining firm’s membership of BA,
which is not included in Equations 1 and 2.
Logit marginal effect estimates of BA membership,
as shown in Table 5, highlight that the likelihood of
business networking is significantly higher among
foreign firms, exporting firms and also those from the
Balkan countries, while it is lower for younger firms
and also for SMEs. Using these logit estimates of BA
membership, we then generate the fitted value of BA
membership as an instrument for firms’ actual
BA membership, which is, in turn, to be used in
estimating firms’ financing opportunities (Equations
1 and 2) at the second stage.
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Although we have tried to use convincing exclusion
restrictions between the first- stage estimation of
firms’ business affiliation and the second-stage esti-
mation of choice of financing mode, concerns may still
arise about the validity of the exclusion restrictions in
cross-section data-set that we have used so far. One
possible alternative is to make use of the available
panel information of sample firms for 2002 and 2005,
although the latter considerably reduces the sample
size (note that the 2-year BEEPS panel data corre-
sponds to only about 15.35% of our total observa-
tions in BEEPS 2005). These are the firms initially
surveyed in the BEEPS 2002 round and then were re-
surveyed in BEEPS 2005, having expressed a desire to
be involved in the 2005 BEEPS round. Note, however,
that firms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although
surveyed in 2005, were either not surveyed in 2002
or refused to be involved in the BEEPS round of 2005
having participated in BEEPS 2002. The firms were
identified through a firm identity number allocated to
such firms in the BEEPS 2005 survey round. In
particular, about 390 firms in 15 selected countries are
included in this panel, giving rise to 780 observations
in total for the considered 2 years (2002 and 2005).
The underlying idea is that, ceteris paribus, variation
in BA affiliation of firms over these 2 years, 2002 and
2005, would allow us to identify the causal effect of
BA membership on firms’ financing opportunities
(Equations 1 and 2). We construct very similar
regression variables used in the cross-section analysis
of Equations 1 and 2. Means and SDs of these
variables are shown in the Appendix (Table A1),
which generally highlight their comparability with
2005 data used in the cross-section analysis.
We use this panel data fixed effects logit model to
determine i-th firm’s financing choice (100% internal
finance, bank finance, equity finance and nonbank
finance) for new investment in the year t, t¼ 2002,
2005, in country c, in terms of business affiliation as
one of the possible covariates X. We assume that the
underlying unobserved variable Yict is determined by
Yict ¼ 	0 þ	BABAit þ	zIQct þ	BAIQBAit  IQct
þ	xXit þ
i þ eit ð3Þ
such that
Yict ¼ 1 if Y

ict4 0
Yict ¼ 0 otherwise
In this respect, we choose four Ys pertaining to firm’s
financing choice of relying only on 100% internal
finance, bank finance, equity finance and nonbank
finance (each of them being a binary variable) and
run four separate fixed effects logit models (see
discussion in the Section ‘Pooled and panel fixed
effects estimates for firms’ access to state, private
domestic and foreign bank loans’). There are two
error terms in the model – one firm-specific (time
invariant) 
i and the other eit that varies not only
across firms but also over time. The firm-specific
fixed effects 
is allow us to control for firm-specific
(time-invariant) unobserved variables, which in turn
minimizes the estimation bias arising out of firm-level
unobserved heterogeneity, thus justifying the use of
the fixed effects logit model.
While we include similar explanatory variables in
all fixed effects models captured by Equation 3, the
time invariant factors are dropped from the estima-
tion of fixed effects logit models. As before, in order to
test the validity of our null hypotheses H10 and H20,
we consider the sign and significance of the estimated
coefficient of firm’s BA membership and also its
interaction with the institutional quality index.
IV. Results
This section presents and analyses our empirical
results. We start with the pooled logit estimates of
firm financing using the predicted value of BA (see
the Section ‘Pooled logit estimates of firm financing
choices’). These estimates are summarized in Table 6.
Table 7 augments the estimates of Table 6 by
Table 5. Logit marginal effects estimates of BA affiliation
Dependent variable BA
State firm ÿ0.0517
(0.0700)
Foreign firm 0.157**
(0.0667)
Private domestic firm ÿ0.0251
(0.0523)
SMEs ÿ0.310***
(0.0369)
Young firm ÿ0.133***
(0.0228)
Exporting firm 0.145***
(0.0244)
Balkan country 0.358***
(0.0221)
Number of observations 2365
Log-likelihood ÿ1426.54
Likelihood ratio Chi-square (7) 327.88***
Notes: The table reports the first-stage pooled logit
(marginal effects) regression estimates for firm’s BA affil-
iation using 2005 BEEPS. All SEs are clustered at the firm
level so as to minimize the problem of autocorrelation over
the years. Robust SEs are shown in parentheses.
** and *** denote significance at the 5 and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Table 6. Pooled logit marginal effects of firms’ financing opportunities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Internal finance Bank finance Nonbank finance Equity finance
Predicted BA (BA) ÿ0.038** 0.0719*** ÿ0.0431*** ÿ0.00955
(0.0182) (0.0149) (0.0142) (0.00667)
Institutional quality (IQ) 0.0022 ÿ0.007* ÿ0.00590* 0.00311*
(0.00415) (0.00362) (0.00308) (0.00188)
BA X IQ ÿ0.009** 0.008*** 0.00697*** 0.00155
(0.00366) (0.00315) (0.00271) (0.00129)
State firm 0.043 ÿ0.151*** ÿ0.0333 ÿ0.0271*
(0.0613) (0.0323) (0.0418) (0.0158)
Foreign firm 0.103 ÿ0.114*** 0.0508 ÿ0.00856
(0.0629) (0.0372) (0.0568) (0.0224)
Private domestic firm 0.026 ÿ0.003 ÿ0.0160 ÿ0.0092
(0.0479) (0.0401) (0.0390) (0.0224)
Growth of fixed assets ÿ0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0005*** ÿ0.0003
(0.00046) (0.00031) (0.0002) (0.00013)
Research and development spending ÿ0.00003 0.00007 0.00001 0.00002
(0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00003) (0.00001)
SMEs 0.034 0.0196 ÿ0.126** ÿ0.0388
(0.0529) (0.0408) (0.0535) (0.0306)
Young firm ÿ0.085 ÿ0.0507 ÿ0.0466 0.0127
(0.107) (0.0800) (0.0732) (0.0335)
SME * Young firm 0.0428 0.0460 0.0310 0.00134
(0.110) (0.0859) (0.0797) (0.0328)
Competition policy ÿ0.0952*** 0.0488*** 0.0535** 0.0287**
(0.0300) (0.0256) (0.0243) (0.0145)
Wald test of BA, BA*IQ 12.24*** 37.19*** 12.98*** 2.44
McKelvey and Zavoina pseudo-R2 0.0321 0.0739 0.0395 0.1688
Likelihood Chi-square (12) 49.66*** 92.85*** 41.74*** 56.97***
Number of observations 2365 2365 2365 2365
Notes: SEs are clustered at the firm level. Robust SEs are shown in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 7. Pooled logit marginal effects of firms’ financing opportunities with Balkan dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable 100% Internal finance Bank finance Nonbank finance Equity finance
Predicted BA (BA) ÿ0.117*** 0.121*** 0.0502* 0.001
(0.0407) (0.0335) (0.0303) (0.0157)
Institutional quality (IQ) 0.00290 ÿ0.0081** ÿ0.0066** 0.003
(0.00417) (0.00373) (0.00315) (0.00189)
BA * Institutional quality ÿ0.009*** 0.01*** 0.008*** 0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Balkan 0.226*** ÿ0.187*** ÿ0.225*** ÿ0.0474
(0.00703) (0.0490) (0.0396) (0.0332)
Balkan country* BA ÿ0.0831 0.151*** 0.163*** 0.055
(0.0523) (0.0563) (0.0866) (0.0871)
Wald test of joint significance of BA and IQ 16.61*** 25.13*** 11.18*** 1.46
McKelvey and Zavoina pseudo-R2 0.0359 0.0815 0.0663 0.188
Likelihood ratio Chi-square (14) 58.08*** 106.09*** 52.80 68.18
Number of observations 2365 2365 2365 2365
Notes: SEs are clustered at the firm level. Robust SEs are shown in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Other control variables are as in Table 6.
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including the Balkan dummy and also its interaction
with the institutional quality variable. In this respect,
we also compare the effect of instrumented BA
variable with the corresponding un-instrumented
estimates (see the Appendix). The Section ‘Fixed
effects panel logit estimates of firm financing choice’
considers the fixed effects panel logit estimates of four
firms’ financing choices for new fixed investment
(Table 8). Finally, the Section ‘Pooled and panel fixed
effects estimates for firms’ access to state, private
domestic and foreign bank loans’ examines the
robustness of our estimates by considering firms’
choice of banks (state, private domestic and foreign)
as functions of firms’ BA membership. As with firms’
financing choices, we consider both the pooled and
panel fixed effects logit estimates. All SEs are
clustered at the firm level with a view to reduce the
correlation of errors over time.
Pooled logit estimates of firm financing choices
Table 6 summarizes the pooled logit estimates of
firms’ financing choices using the instrumented value
of BA membership. Column 1 shows the logit
marginal effects of the probability of firms relying
solely on internal finance while columns 2–4 show the
logit marginal effects of firm’s reliance solely on bank
finance, nonbank finance and equity finance, if any,
respectively. All SEs are clustered at the firm level.
We also show the McKelvey and Zavoina pseudo-R2
for the model with the instrumented BA variable,
which is defined as the proportion of the variance of
the latent variable that is explained by the covariates.
In other words,
McKelvey and Zavoina pseudo-R2
¼ Var yð Þ= Var yð Þ þ Var errorð Þð Þ
where y* refers to the unobservable binary dependent
variable (pertaining to internal or external financing
choices as in Equations 1 and 2) and Var(error) in the
logit is assumed to be equal to (3.14)2/3. This is a
goodness-of-fit for the logistic model, which is based
on a latent model structure. These pseudo-R2 values
justify the goodness-of-fit of the logit models using
the instrumented BA variable. More importantly, the
statistical significance of the likelihood ratio chi-
squared statistic in each case confirms the joint
significance of the covariates of these estimated
models.
Given that the estimated logit coefficients do not
reflect the marginal effects of our explanatory vari-
ables, we compute the marginal effects and report
them in the table. This enables us to examine the
magnitude of the marginal effect of each of the
explanatory variables on the particular dependent
variable in question.
Since a significant proportion of sample firms
relied solely on internal finance, we estimated the
determinants of the likelihood of relying solely on
internal finance. It follows that firms affiliated to BAs
are about four percentage points significantly less
likely to rely fully on internal finance. While the
institutional quality variable per se does not have any
significant effect on the likelihood of relying on
Table 8. Fixed effects logit marginal effects of firms’ financing opportunities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables
100% internal
finance
Bank
finance¼ 1
Nonbank
finance¼ 1
Equity
finance¼ 1
BA ÿ0.287 0.859*** ÿ2.30*** ÿ0.847
(0.241) (0.280) (0.291) (1.000)
Institutional quality 0.143 ÿ0.172 ÿ0.611** ÿ0.050***
(0.221) (0.285) (0.274) (0.0102)
BA * Institutional quality 0.0591 ÿ0.0584 0.0797* 0.0259
(0.0416) (0.0410) (0.0414) (0.183)
Growth of fixed assets 0.003 ÿ0.005* 0.005 ÿ0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
LR Chi-square (4) 0.463 2.93** 16.47*** 6.54***
Number of observations 298 234 622 60
Number of firms 149 117 311 30
Notes: The table makes use of the panel component of BEEPS 2002 and 2005 data. All SEs are clustered at firm
level. Robust SEs are shown in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively.
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internal finance, BA membership significantly boosts
the marginal effect of internal firm financing when
institutional quality improves (note that the interac-
tion between the institutional quality and BA is
positive and significant).
In view of our central hypothesis, we particularly
focus on the logit estimates of the likelihood of
relying on bank finance (see column 2). These
estimates are generally consistent with our central
hypothesis that affiliation to business networks sig-
nificantly improves firms’ access to external bank
finance in our sample of emerging economies with
weaker institutions. Firms from countries with better
institutions tend to have less bank finance. However,
the role of BA membership continues to significantly
boost firm’s reliance on bank finance even when the
institutional quality improves.
As our central variable BA membership is a
dummy variable taking the values of 1 and 0, we
need to be careful in interpreting its reported
marginal effect on the likelihood of any given kind
of firms’ financing choice. In particular, for given
values of all other exogenous variables, the marginal
effect of BA membership of a firm needs to be
interpreted relative to nonmembership of BA.
Further caution needs to be taken while interpreting
the estimates of the interaction term, BA membership
and institutional quality. Hence, from Equation 2, we
calculate the total marginal effect of BA membership
for bank finance as follows:
dBFic=dBAic ¼ BA þ BAIQ  IQc
Table 6 suggests that BA¼ 0.0719 when BAIQ¼
0.008, while the institutional quality index ranges
between ÿ9.9 (Bosnia and Harzegovina) and 8.5
(Estonia). Thus for Estonia, the country with the
highest institutional quality index of 8.5 (Table 4), the
likelihood of relying on any bank finance is signifi-
cantly higher for networked (relative to nonnet-
worked) firms by about 0.1399 or about
14 percentage points. In contrast, for a country like
Bosnia and Harzegovina, which has the lowest
institutional quality index of ÿ9.9, the interaction
effect (BAIQ * IQc) outweighs the direct effect of BA
membership (BA) and the total effect of networking
turns out to be ÿ0.0073; in other words, a networked
firm does not gain positively from networking in this
case as the institutional quality is so weak. In this
context, it is also important to compare the instru-
mented marginal effects estimates with un-instrumen-
ted ones (we do not show the un-instrumented results,
but these results are available upon request). There is
suggestion that un-instrumented estimates are biased
upwards; in particular, access to bank-finance is
higher by about 35 percentage points for networked
firms. Further, the two coefficients involving institu-
tional quality remain insignificant in the un-instru-
mented estimates though they turn out to be
significant in the instrumented estimates.
Next, Table 7 includes the Balkan dummy and also
its interaction with BA. In general, the effect of
networking remains robust to the inclusion of these
additional variables as has been highlighted by the
positive and significant coefficient estimates of
instrumented BA variable and also its interaction
with the institutional quality. Note, however, that the
size of the estimated marginal effect of BA is slightly
larger when we include these additional controls.
As regards other results, firms with growing fixed
assets tend to have significantly more bank and
nonbank credit. However, the effect of firm size or
firm age remains insignificant for determining the
probability of firms relying on any type of financing.
Further, the Balkan dummy is negative and signifi-
cant for bank financing while BA membership in
Balkan countries tends to significantly boost both
bank and equity finance.
Fixed effects panel logit estimates of firm financing
choice
Next we consider the panel fixed effects logit
estimates of firm’s financing choices, especially
because these fixed effects estimates tend to minimize
the endogeneity bias arising from the inclusion of
time-invariant omitted factors. Since only logit (and
not probit) models are amenable to fixed effects
estimates, Table 8 shows the logit fixed effects’
marginal effects estimates of firm’s access to internal
finance, bank finance, nonbank finance and equity
finance (see columns 1–4 of the table). All SEs are
clustered at the firm level. Note that we lose a
significant number of observations in the panel fixed
effects model if there is no variation in the access to
loans from the particular source over the 2 years in
our sample.
As before, fixed effects estimates (marginal effects)
of firms’ internal and external financing choices
shown in Table 8 support the significance of BA
membership for obtaining bank finance and nonbank
finance only. Relative to pooled logit estimates shown
in Tables 6 and 7, fixed effects estimates are bigger in
size though the nature of the relationship remains
rather similar. In particular, the coefficient of BA
membership instrument is 0.859 so that these fixed
effects estimates highlight a much larger and signif-
icant networking advantage in our sample. In con-
trast, networking is associated with significantly
lower likelihood of relying on nonbank finance.
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However, unlike pooled logit estimates, neither insti-
tutional quality nor its interaction with BA member-
ship turns out to be significant in panel fixed effects
models. In other words, there is some support to our
second hypothesis that the significance of BA
vanishes as institutional quality improves. However,
it would be useful to examine the robustness of this
result using a bigger panel sample, if possible.
Pooled and panel fixed effects estimates for
firms’ access to state, private domestic and
foreign bank loans
Finally, in this section, we examine the role of BA
membership for firm’s access to loans from state
bank, private domestic commercial bank and foreign
bank. Following Table 4, we define three binary
variables as follows:
Bank private¼ 1 if a firm borrows from aprivate
domestic commercial bank and
zero otherwise:
Bank state¼ 1 if a firm borrows from a
domestic state bank and zero otherwise:
Bank foreign¼ 1 if a firm borrows from a
foreign bank and zero otherwise:
Given the binary nature of these variables, we first
use pooled logit models to determine each of this
choice (namely, state banks, private domestic banks
and foreign banks). As before, we test the validity of
our null hypotheses H10 and H20, but now with
respect to firms’ access to banks classified by own-
ership (i.e. state, private domestic commercial and
foreign).
To rationalize the effect of BA membership on the
choice of foreign banks, we consider the literature on
foreign banks’ entry and lending behaviour in devel-
oping and transition economies (e.g. see, Bonin and
Leven, 1996). There is a suggestion that foreign banks
tend to lend to borrowers with better accounting and
reporting standards (and thus may prefer foreign
firms) or with those firms that have established
international links by virtue of their import/export
activities. In an uncertain foreign environment, for-
eign banks may choose networked firms with a view
to lower their agency costs. This is related to the
concept of firm–bank ownership matching, as
observed by Berger et al. (2006) for India.
Accordingly, we examine whether foreign firms are
more likely to borrow from foreign banks while state-
owned firms are more likely to borrow from state
banks in our sample of the CEE countries. However,
we do not have a prior knowledge as to how BA
membership can influence firm’s choice of private
domestic or state banks, and therefore empirically
explore these cases in our sample.
Given the potential endogeneity problem of a
firm’s affiliation to a BA, first we instrument this
variable, using BA membership estimates shown in
Table 5. The set of firm-specific control variables has
some common variables as in X (see Equations 1 and
2); for example, we continue to include control
variables for SMEs, young firms, and also firm
ownership type (state firm, domestic firm, foreign
firm). As we focus on banking relationship only, we
now replace the competition policy index by the
EBRD bank reform index which is more pertinent for
firms’ access to banks, with a view to explore the
effect of bank reform on firms’ access to state, private
domestic and private foreign banks.2
Table 9 shows the marginal effects of the pooled
logit model determining firm’s access to state bank,
private domestic commercial banks and foreign
banks in 2005. All SEs are clustered at the firm
level. Our diagnostic tests confirm the goodness-of-
fit of the estimated logit model in this respect. While
BA membership is insignificant for firms’ access to
loans from state bank, the coefficient of the variable
is positive and significant for firms borrowing not
only from private domestic commercial bank, but
also from foreign banks. In other words, affiliation
to BA is conducive to securing loans particularly
from new domestic and foreign private banks, which
face uncertain business conditions, especially in
countries with weaker institutional environment in
our sample. Further compared to foreign banks, the
marginal effect of BA membership is significantly
higher for domestic banks (10 percentage points as
opposed to about two percentage points). In other
words, private domestic banks tend to rely more on
firms’ BA membership with a view to hedge risk in
an uncertain world. In addition, the interaction term
between BA membership and institutional quality is
positive and significant only for loans from domestic
banks so that domestic banks tend to offer signif-
icantly higher loans to networked firms even in
countries with better institutional quality in our
sample.
It is evident that state banks’ role has been curtailed
by the recent reforms as the transition process deepens
and as such there is evidence that state firms are less
likely to borrow from any private banks – domestic or
2We included all institutional variables in an alternative specification, but the competition index was never significant.
Thus, the final specification does not include the competition index.
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foreign. In addition, foreign firms are less likely to
borrow from private domestic commercial banks,
while the estimated coefficient is insignificant for
loans from state and foreign banks. In contrast, there
is no evidence that private domestic commercial firms
are more or less likely to borrow from any type of
banks in our sample. Accordingly, the evidence of
firm-bank ownership matching turns out to be rather
weak in these pooled estimates.
Finally, we consider the corresponding panel fixed
effects logit estimates of firms’ choice of banks as
summarized in Table 10. This is because we argue
that fixed effects estimates are superior to pooled
estimates since we can exploit the variation in firm’s
Table 9. Pooled logit marginal effects estimates of firms’ access to banks by ownership
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable State bank Private domestic bank Private foreign bank
Predicted BA (BA) ÿ0.000438 0.100*** 0.0174**
(0.0130) (0.0295) (0.0811)
Institutional quality (IQ) 0.00441** ÿ0.0119*** ÿ0.00169
(0.00183) (0.0033) (0.00121)
BA * Institutional quality 0.002** 0.009*** ÿ0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
State firm ÿ0.0243** ÿ0.0823** ÿ0.0141*
(0.009) (0.034) (0.008)
Foreign firm ÿ0.0200 ÿ0.107*** ÿ0.003
(0.0123) (0.0294) (0.0117)
Private domestic firm ÿ0.005 0.013 0.003
(0.015) (0.034) (0.009)
Balkan country ÿ0.0338 ÿ0.144*** ÿ0.0191**
(0.0226) (0.0414) (0.009)
Balkan country* BA 0.0633 0.0692 0.0228
(0.0791) (0.0485) (0.0202)
Wald test of joint significance of BA and BA*IQ 4.66* 25.88*** 5.11*
McKelvey and Zavoina pseudo-R2 0.0644 0.0421 0.1189
Likelihood ratio Chi-square (14) 51.71*** 88.84*** 87.09***
Number of observations 2365 2365 2365
Notes: All SEs are clustered at the firm level. Robust SEs are shown in parentheses. Other control variables include firm size
(SMEs), young firms, growth of fixed assets, research and development spending and also EBRD bank reform index.
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 10. Logit fixed effects estimates of firms’ access to banks
Firms borrowing from
State bank Local private commercial bank Foreign bank
BA ÿ0.611 0.754*** 1.336
(0.842) (0.325) (1.475)
Institutional quality 0.0399 0.0632 Na[1]
(6.507) (0.351)
BA * Institutional quality 0.0945 ÿ0.0608 ÿ0.0766
(0.137) (0.0527) (0.250)
Growth of fixed assets ÿ0.0126 ÿ0.006** 0.0181
(0.0454) (0.00327) (0.0149)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
LR Chi-square (4) 0.23 2.16* 0.68
Number of observations 82 196 50
Number of firms 41 98 25
Notes: The table makes use of the panel component of BEEPS 2002 and 2005 data. All SEs are clustered at firm
level. Robust SEs are shown in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively.
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BA membership over the 2 years to identify a causal
effect of BA on firms’ access to any bank loans. As
with single cross-section analysis, BA membership
significantly enhances the likelihood of firms bor-
rowing from private domestic banks, but not from
state or foreign banks, as the estimated coefficients
remain insignificant in these cases. In particular, a
networked firm (relative to a nonnetworked firm) is
about 75 percentage points more likely to borrow
from private commercial banks, even after control-
ling for all other possible covariates. Note also that
compared to the pooled estimates (Table 9), marginal
effects of networking is higher in panel data estimates
(0.75 as opposed to 0.10 for private domestic banks).
Finally, the differential effect of networking vanishes
for access to loans from private banks as institutional
quality improves. However, the fact remains that the
size of our panel sample is rather small, and therefore
it would be interesting to see if these results hold in
larger samples.
V. Concluding Comments
Financial intermediation may not always guarantee
the efficient utilization of credit, especially if there are
market imperfections and institutional weaknesses. In
this respect, this article explores a possible mechanism
through which networking, as measured by firm’s
affiliation to BA, could affect firms’ financing
opportunities, which in turn determine corporate
investment and growth in the selected CEE countries.
Following the recent institutional economics as
well as organizational behaviour literature, we argue
that firms’ association with informal business net-
works may help them secure external finances in
general and bank finance in particular, especially in
countries with weaker institutions. We further exam-
ine if the importance of affiliation to business
networks disappears in countries with better institu-
tional quality. Results from a sample of CEE
transition countries do confirm the positive role of
business networks on firm’s access to bank finance.
In particular, there is evidence that affiliation to BA
significantly boosts networked firms’ access to bank
loans, even after controlling for all possible factors.
Positive role of networks for members is particularly
evident for firms borrowing from private domestic
commercial banks and also, to a lesser extent, from
foreign banks. The effect is robust in both single
cross-section and panel data analyses, though there is
some evidence that single cross-section estimates tend
to under-estimate the effect of networking. With
respect to our second hypothesis, there is evidence
from the single cross-section estimates that the
importance of BA persists even when the institutional
quality improves, especially for firms’ access to bank
and nonbank finance and also for firm’s borrowing
from state and private domestic banks. Note, how-
ever, that the significant differential effect of BA for
countries with higher institutional quality disappears
when we consider panel data instead.
Forming networks to secure bank loans and other
business facilities may not necessarily be an efficient
arrangement for the broader economy, as it may
promote the interests of those networked firms which
are successful to belong to good networks through
family/political connections or otherwise, but are not
necessarily more efficient firms. In this process
nonnetworked SMEs are discriminated, despite var-
ious on-going reforms. In other words, contrary to
the common wisdom, evidence from our analysis
suggests that social capital may not necessarily be a
welfare improving arrangement.
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Appendix
Table A1. Descriptive statistics
2005 sample 2002 and 2005 panel data
Variable names Mean SD Mean SD
100% Internal finance 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50
Bank finance 0.26 0.43 0.27 0.44
Nonbank finance 0.19 0.39 0.60 0.49
Equity finance 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22
State banks 0.04 0.20 0.053 0.22
Private domestic commercial banks 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39
Foreign banks 0.03 0.17 0.037 0.19
BA 0.48 0.50 0.38 0.48
Growth of fixed assets 16.96 33.96 22.70 44.44
Institutional quality 3.63 4.60 2.13 4.95
Source: 2002 and 2005 BEEPS data and EBRD institutional indices.
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